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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the normative and strategic impact of the Bologna Process on the 
New Zealand University system. We argue that, from a normative perspective, Bologna has 
not resulted in substantive change. Nevertheless, a specific, if low-level, normative response 
has been evident, driven by perceived market incentives and the market-based norms that 
underpin higher education and internationalisation strategies in the New Zealand context. We 
contend that this response necessitates a conceptual extension of the normative power 
framework. From a strategic perspective, we consider the extent to which Bologna has 
succeeded in making Europe a geographic focus in New Zealand University 
internationalisation strategies. In this respect, we find strategic priorities lie elsewhere, again 
reflecting the competitive market-based norms that underpin higher education in New 
Zealand.  
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In this article, we examine both the normative and strategic impact of the Bologna Process in 
New Zealand. From a normative perspective, we consider the extent to which the Bologna 
Process has prompted domestic reform beyond European borders, utilising the framework of 
Normative Power Europe. The aim is not to enter the debate as to whether the European 
Union (EU) is a normative power, nor is it to consider the extent to which the EU’s 
involvement in the Bologna Process represents an attempt to assert normative power. Rather, 
the aim is to examine the extent to which the norms contained within the Bologna Process 
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have spread beyond the borders of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA), focussing 
on the case of New Zealand. In this respect, we find no evidence of substantive change, but 
this is not to say that a normative impact has been entirely absent. Evident is a specific, if 
low-level, response driven by the competitive market-based norms that underpin the 
internationalisation strategies of New Zealand universities. This response challenges existing 
frameworks for understanding Normative Power Europe, requiring some conceptual 
extension in order to adequately address the New Zealand case.  
From a strategic perspective, we are interested in the extent to which the Bologna 
Process has met its goal of increasing the international attractiveness of the European system 
of higher education, using New Zealand as a case study. This objective has been central to the 
Bologna Process from the very beginning. The Sorbonne Declaration (1998) stated that “the 
international recognition and attractive potential of our systems are directly related to their 
external and internal readabilities.” One year later, the Bologna Declaration (1999) included 
“the objective of increasing the international competitiveness of the European system of 
higher education,” adding that “we need to ensure that the European higher education system 
acquires a world-wide degree of attraction equal to our extraordinary cultural and scientific 
traditions.” This goal has been further elaborated upon in subsequent Ministerial 
Communiqués, including the Bergen Communiqué (2005, 4) which noted that “the European 
Higher Education Area must be open and should be attractive to other parts of the world.” It 
went on to state that “we see the European Higher Education Area as a partner of higher 
education systems in other regions of the world, stimulating balanced student and staff 
exchange and cooperation between higher education institutions” (5). In light of these 
objectives, we examine the strategic importance attached to Europe by universities in New 
Zealand, finding that university internationalisation strategies rooted in a competitive market-
based higher education system have in practice resulted in a different geographic focus.  
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The paper is based on an analysis of key policy documents and a survey completed by 
New Zealand university representatives guided by the analytic interests discussed above. The 
policy documents include reports, papers and communications within which the Bologna 
Process is the focus, or referenced. The survey was designed to get an insight into the 
internationalisation strategies of universities in New Zealand, including their priorities and 
drivers. The survey asked respondents to identify, inter alia, the priorities guiding 
internationalisation at their institution, reasons underpinning the internationalisation process, 
and key external drivers of internationalisation, as well as identifying and ranking (by region 
and state) the geographic foci of their internationalisation strategy. Moreover, it asked 
specifically about key European initiatives, namely the Bologna Process and the EHEA, the 
European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS), the Bologna Diploma 
Supplement, the Lisbon Recognition Convention, Erasmus+ and Horizon2020. Respondents 
were asked whether they were aware of each of these initiatives and whether they play any 
role in the internationalisation strategies of their institution. The survey was directed to the 
person with strategic oversight of internationalisation at each university, but they were 
encouraged to consult with other colleagues as appropriate. The survey was distributed 
electronically to all eight New Zealand universities, with respondents also being given 
alternative feedback mechanisms (e.g. face-to-face engagement) should these be preferred. A 
response rate of 50 per cent was achieved. 
Before presenting our findings, we discuss the concept of normative power and the 
nature of internationalisation in the New Zealand context. These two contextual sections 
provide necessary background information for addressing the normative influence of the 
Bologna Process in New Zealand, while the latter is important for understanding the level of 





The concept of normative power, stemming from Manners (2002) seminal article, was an 
attempt to move beyond the civilian–military dichotomy that had to that point dominated 
debate on the European Union’s international role. It was framed as a supplement both to 
Duchêne’s conception of a civilian organisation “long on economic power” (Duchêne 1973, 
19), and to Bull’s “need for military power” (Bull 1982, 19), arguing that EU influence need 
not necessarily be built on such a material foundation. In so doing, it rests on three 
fundamental claims: (i) that new forms of agency are replacing, or at least joining, sovereign 
states as actors in the international system; (ii) that universal principles of peace and justice 
increasingly define the international space within which actors operate; and (iii) that the 
European Union embodies these transformations which are in turn at the core of its identity 
as an international actor (Aggestam 2009, 29). 
For Manners, the concept of normative power recognised European influence in the 
realm of ideas, of ‘power over opinion’, of ‘ideological force’: the EU as ideational power. 
According to this conception, it is the centrality of its core norms that defines the Union as an 
actor: “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does 
or what it says, but what it is” (Manners 2002, 252). At a basic level, therefore, norms occupy 
two places: (i) as a value to be transmitted to other actors and to be diffused throughout the 
international system – Manners’ (239) “idée force” or “ability to shape conceptions of 
‘normal’ in international relations”; and (ii) as a framework guiding the Union’s external 
relations – as the Treaty on European Union asserts, “[t]he Union’s action on the 
international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, 
development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world” (European 
Union 2012, art.21). Normative power, in other words, may be embodied both in ‘presence’ 
and in ‘action’, or as Gerrits (2009, 4) alternatively suggests, by ‘default’ and by ‘design’. 
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Clearly, this conception of normative power raises a number of important questions. 
First, while as noted normative power is an attempt to move beyond debates dominated by 
discussions of empirical strength in international relations, as embodied in statist conceptions 
of actorness, must normative power necessarily be divorced from such a material foundation? 
For Aggestam (2009, 29) this is definitively the case: “the central aim of NPE”, she asserts, 
“is about the power of ideas themselves. Their attraction should be seen as independent from 
any link to material incentives”. In her view, resiling from this position would fundamentally 
undermine the distinctiveness of the concept of Normative Power Europe. By contrast, 
Manners’ (2002, 239) initial formulation saw normative power as augmenting rather than 
replacing other conceptions of power, suggesting even at the outset that this distinction was 
not to be so strongly drawn. This is a position that has strengthened in Manners’ 
conceptualisation, with subsequent acknowledgement being made that “economic incentives 
or military capabilities may underpin normative power” (Diez and Manners 2007, 176). In 
such a view, for example, it is reasonable to suggest that the attractiveness of the Union’s 
economic norms would be related to its perceived economic strength/success. 
Second, how is the influence of normative power, be it active or passive, to be 
conceptualised? How are norms spread? Manners (2002, 242–245) addresses this directly, 
identifying six mechanisms of norm diffusion: contagion, informational, procedural, 
transference, overt, and the cultural filter. These may be roughly categorised as direct 
(informational, procedural, transference, overt) and indirect (contagion, cultural filter) 
mechanisms of norm diffusion. Notwithstanding its centrality to the conceptualisation of 
normative power, however, this framework is insufficient to the task of this article in 
examining New Zealand as a receiver (or not) of Bologna norms, focused as it is on the 
European Union and its role as norm-sender. Since Manners’ initial formulation, however, 
significant literature on norm diffusion has emerged, examining the manner in which “ideas, 
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normative standards, or… policies and institutions spread across time and space” (Börzel and 
Risse 2012, 5). In this we can find a range of elements that intersect with, and provide further 
nuance to, the mechanisms outlined above and which help to explain the normative impact of 
the Bologna Process in New Zealand. This is particularly the case in relation to indirect 
diffusion. Where Manners highlights in broad brush strokes the way in which third parties 
adopt norms through a process of ‘contagion’,1 Börzel and Risse further unpack such 
normative emulation, pointing to three distinct mechanisms. Competition involves the 
adoption of best practice in the context of rivalry with other actors, for example to promote 
economic growth (9). Lesson drawing involves the adoption of norms in the context of 
problem solving, with the transference of norms into the domestic context that are perceived 
elsewhere to have solved a problem currently being faced (9–10). Normative emulation is 
premised on the desire to be a “member[] of the international community ‘in good standing’” 
(10), with the adoption of particular norms (e.g. on human rights, the rule of law) seen as 
serving a legitimising function in this respect. Finally, mimicry is a more passive process of 
downloading norms, policies or institutions because these are in essence appropriate – they 
are “what everybody does in a given community” (10). Where competition and lesson 
drawing essentially stem from an analysis made by actors as to the functional value of norms, 
policies and institutions, normative emulation and mimicry are related more to the perceived 
legitimacy of the norm sender – in this case the European Union (see e.g. Jetschke and 
Murray 2012, 181). 
The final question that can be raised in relation to the concept of normative power 
relates to outcome: in identifying the expression of normative power, must there be a 
transformative impact? As Birchfield (2011, 144) notes, “the extent to which the EU has been 
able to project power and influence and diffuse its norms is one test by which scholars are 
                                                             




able to demonstrate the conceptual and theoretical advantages of the NPE concept”, 
suggesting therefore the significance of outcome. And indeed for Manners (2008, 47), 
Normative Power Europe is to be judged “in terms of its principles, actions and impact”, a 
tripartite formulation in which consideration of the “impact and outcomes of EU actions” 
(58) is central. Importantly, however, the impact of norm diffusion is again varied. In this 
respect, Risse (2015, 5) recognises three potential outcomes. Adoption/convergence involves 
the wholesale importing of normative structures. By contrast, adaptation/transformation 
recognises that localisation processes may also be at play, adapting structures to domestic 
circumstances. Finally, resistance posits rejection of normative influences a third potential 
outcome of norm diffusion. As will become clear, however, these categories are not sufficient 
to the task of explaining the normative impact of the Bologna process in the New Zealand 
case, with a conceptual extension – compliance confirmation – being posited in this article as 
a way to frame an evident, if low-level, response.  
 
Internationalisation in the New Zealand Context: The Marketisation of Education 
The single most significant factor in the internationalisation strategies of New Zealand 
universities today was the rapid transformation of New Zealand’s economy to neoliberal 
market orthodoxy that took place from the mid-1980s. When the fourth Labour Government 
was elected in 1984, it was confronted with a fiscal deficit and debt crisis. Under the prior 
National Government (1975–1984), and following the oil crisis of 1973–1974, a Keynesian 
policy of significant external borrowing to boost economic growth and employment through 
funding domestic infrastructure investments (primarily around energy generation and the 
conversion of main trunk rail lines to electricity) meant a quadrupling of official public debt. 
Over the lifetime of the National Government, net official public debt increased from 4.4 per 
cent of GDP to 29.6 per cent, with an increase in interest from 2.5 per cent to 11.5 per cent of 
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tax receipts (Wilkinson 2017: 5). This was accompanied by an increasing fiscal deficit, which 
by 1984 was approaching 7 per cent of GDP (Evans et al. 1996, 1860; Wilkinson 2017, 6).  
When the Labour Government assumed office on 26 July 1984 it launched a process 
of economic restructuring that saw it “abandon[] its traditional constituencies and orthodoxies 
and pursue[] a rigorous policy of economic liberalism and deregulation” (Pratt and Clark 
2005, 308). Through a mechanism of ‘crash through or crash’, a process of neoliberal 
restructuring took place of such a scale and at such a pace not seen elsewhere in the 
developed world. Deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation were at the core of a these 
reforms, with the market, competition and individual responsibility becoming central to the 
functioning of economy and society. Neoliberal orthodoxy in effect came to penetrate almost 
every aspect of state, economy and society, including the university sector. 
The debate on tertiary education policy took place from the end of the 1980s, centring 
on the extent to which universities should be subject to market disciplines, and involving 
discussion as to whether a university education was a private benefit or a public good. While 
the New Zealand Vice Chancellors’ Committee fell on the public good side of the equation, 
seeing education as a right and advocating maintenance of public funding as far as was 
possible (Universities Review Committee 1987), organisations such as the New Zealand 
Business Roundtable fell toward the other end of the spectrum, arguing that as a private good, 
education should be exposed to the same market framework as other commodities (NZBRT 
1988). This latter view clearly reflected the thinking of the New Zealand Treasury, which 
envisaged government financial intervention as producing sub-optimal outcomes (New 
Zealand Treasury 1987, 177), advocating the removal of government controls and 
mechanisms to instead allow universities to operate as profit centres in a contested 
marketplace (193). In this view, “Information and knowledge are the business of tertiary 
education” [emphasis added] with the most optimal outcomes produced when “the tertiary 
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sector is enabled and given incentives to develop its core business as efficiently as possible” 
(195). It was in this direction that government policy was increasingly to travel. 
The Education Amendment Act 1990 transformed the statutory foundation on which 
the New Zealand University system had been built. From a system of effective autonomy 
under individual Acts of Parliament, a single regulatory framework was established involving 
a move from funding through a semi-independent agency to direct funding from the Ministry 
of Education, as well as the requirement for corporate charters, CEOs, contractual 
engagement with the Ministry and other paraphernalia of economic market actors (Kelsey 
2000; Olssen 2002). A new funding formula was subsequently introduced, which by 1991 
meant that universities were receiving government funding for only 85 per cent of student 
course costs (Olssen 2002, 66), requiring them to make up the difference through fees. At the 
same time, international students, with the exception of those receiving scholarships, whose 
tuition until that point had been heavily subsidised by the government, were required to start 
paying full cost tuition fees (Smith & Parata 1997). In the years since, this marketised vision 
of university education has been strengthened, with greater emphasis on competition among 
tertiary providers for student dollars and annualised funding cycles based on student demand 
(characterised also by ongoing declines in the relative level of central government funding). 
The consequent underfunding of the university sector, the emphasis on universities as 
competitive market actors, and the vision of education as a commodity accumulated for 
individual benefit rather than as a right or a public good, provide the context in which New 
Zealand universities’ internationalisation strategies are to be understood. Importantly, with 
the cost of tuition for domestic students still heavily subsidised by government funding and 
restrictions placed on the level of fees that institutions can charge to cover the difference, the 
fees levied upon international students which are not subject to the same restrictions have 
become an increasingly important mechanism for addressing this funding shortfall. Indeed, 
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the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Auckland observed in 2012 that at his institution, 
“each international student generates on average a margin (in commercial terms, profit) of 
$7000 over that generated by an equivalent domestic student” (McCutcheon 2012).   
 The direct consequence of this policy and legislative evolution is that 
internationalisation in the New Zealand context has been conceived in largely instrumental 
terms as a mechanism for overcoming domestic funding deficits. This stands in stark contrast 
to visions of internationalisation focusing on more cosmopolitan values such as intercultural 
communication, and on the enhancement of educational and research quality.  In this latter 
respect, for example, De Wit and Hunter (2015, 3), revising Knight’s (2003) approach, define 
internationalisation as “the intentional process of integrating an international, intercultural or 
global dimension into the purpose, functions and delivery of post-secondary education, in 
order to enhance the quality of education and research for all students and staff, and to make 
a meaningful contribution to society.”  
This instrumental trend has long been evident in the New Zealand tertiary sector. In a 
2006 study commissioned by the Ministry of Education, for example, it was noted that 
institutional strategies have been dominated by a focus on education exports (McInnes et al. 
2006, 11), with increased revenue and funding identified as the primary benefit of 
internationalisation for tertiary institutions (70). More than a decade later this pattern 
remains. In our survey, when asked to rank their five greatest priorities in relation to the 
various aspects of internationalisation taking place at their institution, three out of four 
respondents ranked expanding the recruitment of international undergraduate and taught-
postgraduate students first; the other ranked it second. When asked to rank the five most 
compelling reasons for promoting internationalisation at their university, revenue generation 
was the only element of internationalisation emphasised by all respondents. Alongside this, 
three of the four universities highlighted the role of internationalisation in increasing their 
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institution’s global profile, which itself may be seen as significant in terms of revenue 
generation through the attraction of foreign students, while one additionally highlighted trade 
in education services. Reinforcing this, the identified external drivers of internationalisation 
among survey respondents heavily focused on issues of funding. Three universities 
underlined the lack of public funding for tertiary education as a key driver: for two it was 
ranked as the primary driver and for the other it was ranked second only behind international 
rankings. For New Zealand universities, therefore, stemming from the neoliberal 
transformation undertaken from the mid-1980s, internationalisation is intrinsically linked 
with revenue generation through competitive engagement in the market for international 
education services. 
Not surprisingly, economic rationales also sit at the heart of the government view of 
internationalisation. The New Zealand Leadership Statement for International Education 
2011 states that “the level of Government funding for secondary and tertiary education will 
continue to be under pressure from broader fiscal demands… Our providers should see 
international education as providing important opportunities for them to generate additional 
revenues on an ongoing basis” (New Zealand Government 2011, 6). It also focuses on wider 
economic benefits, including the contribution that foreign students studying in New Zealand 
make to the national GDP, not only through the payment of tuition fees, but wider 
expenditure while in New Zealand. In this context, the Leadership Statement set the goal of 
doubling the contribution of foreign students across all education sectors from primary school 
to university over the next 15 years to NZ$5 billion (New Zealand Government 2011, 7). 
Less than five years later, it was calculated that New Zealand was nearing this target with the 
total valued at NZ$4.28 billion in 2015/16, placing education as New Zealand’s fourth largest 
export earner behind only dairy, tourism and meat (Education New Zealand 2017). Other 
objectives cited are also linked to the mission of economic growth, including encouraging 
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“the immigration of highly skilled people” (New Zealand Government 2011, 2), as well as 
facilitating people-to-people links and improved cultural and linguistic literacy amongst New 
Zealand students, or in other words, the knowledge and skills required to improve “the 
national ability to increase trade and wider economic connections,” especially with Asia 
(New Zealand Government 2011, 5). The Leadership Statement for International Education 
2011 has recently been replaced by the New Zealand International Education Strategy 2018–
2030, which still places significant weight on the economic value of international students, 
but also has a notably broader focus than the previous policy. It notes that international 
education includes not only international students coming to New Zealand, but “our own 
people travelling the world to experience a global component in their education” (New 
Zealand Government 2018, 3). It goes on to list “developing global citizens” as one of the 
three overarching goals of the policy, alongside “delivering an excellent education and 
student experience” and “achieving sustainable growth” (9). Notwithstanding these recent 
expressions of intent, the New Zealand university system remains firmly rooted in a 
neoliberal market-centred normative context, and it seems unlikely that such formulations 
will have a substantive impact at the institutional level in the foreseeable future, given the 
underlying conditions that drive the focus on student recruitment as a tool for generating 
revenue have not changed.  
 
The Normative Impact of the Bologna Process 
When it comes to the normative impact of the Bologna Process on the New Zealand 
university sector, evidence of substantive influence is at best limited. Nevertheless, some 
indicative influences may be identified. The initial response to Bologna was a governmental 
one: Prompted by industry interest, the Ministry of Education and New Zealand 
Qualifications Authority (NZQA) undertook to determine New Zealand’s compatibility, 
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culminating in the publication of a paper in 2008 titled New Zealand and the Bologna 
Process (New Zealand Ministry of Education and NZQA 2008). While highlighting the 
importance of engaging with Bologna due to the likelihood of it having “a number of 
implications for the international acceptance of New Zealand tertiary education awards and 
options for student mobility” (4), the document is more significant for the way in which 
Bologna was viewed through the lens of New Zealand’s vision of internationalisation, and the 
importance of the international market in education services that this involves. Thus the 
Process was viewed as potentially significant for enhancing the reputation of tertiary 
institutions as providers of “world-class education to both domestic and international 
students” and as a “useful marketing tool in third countries” (4). With university 
internationalisation frameworks significantly directed toward the recruitment of fee-paying 
international students as a way to generate revenue, alongside wider economic benefits, the 
identification of such potential market value in the Bologna Process is unsurprising. 
Similarly, the focus of the paper on assessing New Zealand’s compatibility with the EHEA 
was consistent with a market-based internationalisation strategy for which qualification 
framework conflicts are an important barrier to trade, inhibiting inward student mobility. 
Conceived in terms of norm transfer, what we see here is intriguing evidence of Börzel and 
Risse’s (2012) competition diffusion, with market incentives driving New Zealand 
institutions’ limited engagement with the Bologna Process. In this respect, the examination of 
compatibility is to be conceived as a defensive response in the context of a competitive 
international education market, and entirely consistent with New Zealand universities’ vision 
of internationalisation.  
The 2008 paper concluded that New Zealand was already largely compatible with the 
Bologna Process, including the three-cycle degree structure and the ECTS. However, it did 
also identify areas where further work had been initiated to build on this “high level of 
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comparability,” such as acceding to the Lisbon Recognition Convention in 2008, beginning to 
investigate the introduction of a Diploma Supplement-equivalent and exploring the 
comparability of New Zealand’s Register of Quality Assured Qualifications (New Zealand 
Ministry of Education and NZQA 2008, 3). New Zealand’s accession to the Lisbon 
Recognition Convention was justified as a response to the Bologna Process, driven by the 
need to retain global market competitiveness. The report recommending accession notes that 
it “will align New Zealand with the Bologna Process and ensure that New Zealand’s 
qualifications are better recognised and better understood by Lisbon Convention parties” 
(New Zealand House of Representatives, n.d.). It further explains that accession will “align 
New Zealand with international student market competitors.”  
The Lisbon Recognition Convention requires New Zealand to encourage higher 
education providers to give their students a Diploma Supplement or equivalent upon 
graduation. It was decided to call New Zealand’s Diploma Supplement-equivalent, the 
Tertiary Education Qualification Statement (TEQS). In 2009, guidelines for implementing a 
Tertiary Education Qualification Statement in New Zealand were released (NZQA 2009). 
However, implementation of a TEQS is not mandatory in New Zealand, remaining instead at 
the discretion of individual tertiary education providers. In 2010, a survey found low uptake 
of the TEQS (NZQA n.d.). Despite agreeing that a TEQS would benefit students and 
employers, most institutions were watching the implementation of the Diploma Supplement 
in Europe before implementing its New Zealand-equivalent, the TEQS. In 2018 uptake 
remains low, with only two out of four survey respondents having implemented TEQS, and 
with no respondent identifying the Diploma Supplement as having any bearing on 
internationalisation strategies. 
More recent developments show that compatibility with the Bologna Process 
continues to receive a level of consideration in New Zealand. In 2012, NZQA changed its 
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definition of a Master’s degree, allowing shorter 180 point qualifications. The report 
accompanying this decision addressed Bologna compliance, concluding that “the proposed 
change to the Master’s Degree definition is within the minimum length of Master’s Degrees 
agreed within the ‘Bologna process’,” and that to be compatible Master’s degrees can be 
between 180–240 New Zealand credits, which is considered equivalent to 90–120 ECTS 
(NZQA 2012, 5).  Most recently, NZQA completed a joint project with the European 
Commission undertaking a comparative examination of the New Zealand Qualifications 
Framework (NZQF) and the European Qualifications Framework (EQF). The resulting report 
concluded that “while there are conceptual and functional differences between the NZQF and 
the EQF, due to their different purposes and functions, the analysis shows that both 
frameworks can be considered comparable” (NZQA and European Commission 2017, 4). 
The exception is NZQF level 8 (Bachelor Honours Degrees, Postgraduate Diplomas and 
Certificates). These have been left unlevelled to the EQF, or in other words they were not 
recognised as equivalent to any EQF level. 
So what does this somewhat limited engagement tell us about the normative influence 
of Bologna? The answer returns us to the question of transformative impact: must there be an 
identifiable and substantive change on the part of the norm recipient for diffusion to be 
inferred? As highlighted earlier, for Manners (2008, 47) this is definitively the case, with 
subsequent theorists attempting to conceptualise variation in such impact. Risse’s (2015) 
tripartite framework, for example, recognises the possibility of adoption/convergence, 
adaptation/transformation, or resistance. In the New Zealand case, we might add a fourth 
category: compliance confirmation. While, beyond perhaps acceding to the Lisbon 
Recognition Convention and the subsequent establishment of the TEQS, which has 
nevertheless failed to substantively penetrate the universities themselves, there is little 
evidence of a transformative impact (or indeed of resistance), it is nevertheless noteworthy 
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that compatibility checks have been, and continue to be, undertaken. The perceived need for 
such compliance confirmation is evidence of a level of normative influence, even if 
substantive change is not to be found. The fact of NZQF compatibility makes it difficult to 
measure the influence of the Bologna Process beyond this, though perhaps the decision to 
leave NZQF level 8 unlevelled in relation to the EQF is indicative of an element of 
resistance, or at least the lack of any perception of the need for, changes to New Zealand’s 
Qualifications Framework to bring it more closely into line with its European counterpart. 
 
The Strategic Importance of Europe 
When it comes to the strategic importance attached to Europe by New Zealand universities, 
the primary theme to be drawn from the survey responses is that of absence. This is 
particularly evident in relation to the geographic foci of internationalisation strategies, with 
only two out of four respondents listing Europe among their institution’s top three priority 
regions and both ranking it third when asked to rank regions that have been identified as 
geographic priorities for internationalisation. The overwhelmingly dominant focus is Asia, 
with all respondents ranking it as their institution’s first geographic priority. When the focus 
shifts to which individual countries are geographic priorities, China is at the top of the list, 
with other Asian countries, particularly India and Malaysia, also featuring highly, as well as 
the United States from which there is a sizeable inflow of fee-paying study abroad students. 
In Europe, the United Kingdom is the clear leader, with three respondents ranking it a priority 
(4th, 6th, 11th). EU27 countries, where considered a geographic priority, generally fall 
toward the lower end of the scale. Denmark, France, Germany and Norway are the only other 
European countries listed (7th, 9th, 10th and 12th respectively) and none are cited by 
respondents at more than one institution. Meanwhile, internationalisation initiatives, which 
have a significant history of development in the European context, bear little influence in 
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New Zealand. While there is almost universal awareness of the Bologna Process and the 
EHEA, ECTS, the Bologna Diploma Supplement and the Lisbon Recognition Convention, as 
well as Erasmus+ and Horizon2020, these frameworks are identified as having little influence 
in the New Zealand context, with respondents typically answering that they do not play any 
role in their internationalisation strategies. Exceptions were three institutions referring to the 
practical importance of ECTS, two institutions referring to Erasmus+ and one citing 
Horizon2020. 
How do we explain Europe’s overwhelming absence in the internationalisation 
strategies of New Zealand universities, especially when compared to Asia? Again, we must 
return to the way that internationalisation is conceived in the New Zealand context. With 
internationalisation largely focused on the recruitment of fee-paying international students as 
a way to generate revenue, Europe suffers because it is not considered a major market, 
certainly in comparison to Asia. In 2015/16, the total economic contribution to New Zealand 
of students from Europe across all education sectors was valued at NZ$280 million, roughly 
equal to the total economic contribution of students from Japan alone which was NZ$288 
million (Education New Zealand 2017). By contrast, the economic contribution of students 
from Asia as a whole was valued at NZ$3.14 billion, with China and India the largest 
contributors (NZ$1.4 billion and NZ$659 respectively). 
Looking beyond the recruitment of international students, Europe is the most popular 
destination for New Zealand students who study abroad. In 2016, 1,044 New Zealand 
university students undertook an overseas exchange and 46% of these students went to a 
European country (New Zealand Ministry of Education 2018). However, promoting mobility 
to Europe is not a government priority. Increasing the number of students who spend a study 
period abroad has received recent political support, but the main focus is Asia. In 2013, the 
Prime Minister's Scholarships for Asia (PMSA) were launched, which provide funding for 
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New Zealand higher education students to study or undertake an internship in Asia for a 
period of up to two years. Again, the rationale is largely economic, as articulated by the then 
Tertiary Education Minister, Stephen Joyce in launching the PMSA scheme, “New Zealand’s 
economic future is very tied in with our key trading partners in Asia… We need more young 
Kiwis who have had the experience of spending some time studying in Asia, and can help 
strengthen our people-to-people links with those countries” (Joyce 2013, para. 3). This 
reflects the wider policy agenda, summarised by the following statement: “Our economic 
future will be determined by interactions with the rest of the world – and especially the 
national ability to increase trade and wider economic connections with Asia… The education 
system will need to provide students with the required knowledge and skills” (New Zealand 
Government 2011, 5). For this reason, even when it comes to outbound mobility, Europe is 
not considered a priority, although it will be interesting to see if this changes with the 
recently released New Zealand International Education Strategy 2018–2030 placing emphasis 
on the idea of global citizenship more broadly. As a final point, and reflecting on the 
normative power framework outlined earlier, this Asia focus also offers a response to the 
question as to the material foundations for normative influence. We might, in short, infer that 
the EU market is insufficiently attractive to underpin significant normative transfer to New 
Zealand, providing support to Diez and Manners’ (2007, 176) contention that “economic 
incentives… may underpin normative power.” 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis presented here shows that the Bologna Process has prompted action in New 
Zealand, although evidence of substantive normative influence is limited at best. This 
situation of response without transformation or resistance leads us to suggest an additional 
category of norm diffusion – compliance confirmation – as a way to frame the New Zealand 
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case. It is perhaps most noteworthy that the response in New Zealand has been driven by 
economic incentives that are linked with compliance, conforming to Börzel and Risse’s 
(2012) concept of competition diffusion. Ensuring compatibility with the Bologna Process 
remains a consideration for this reason, but beyond this our analysis shows that New 
Zealand’s internationalisation interests largely lie elsewhere, specifically Asia, driven by an 
institutional approach to internationalisation that is heavily focused on the recruitment of fee-
paying international students as a way to generate revenue and overcome domestic funding 
gaps. The New Zealand International Education Strategy 2018–2030 signals a government 
desire to move away from this model towards a broader vision of internationalisation, but it 
remains to be seen what impact this will have in practice. It is possible that we may see a 
disconnect with universities themselves, whose internationalisation strategies are likely to 
continue to focus on economic realities so long as current funding conditions persist.  
This leaves us with a concluding question as to the generalisability of the New 
Zealand case. Given that the normative influence of the Bologna framework has seemingly 
been insufficient to outweigh the specific focus of internationalisation in the New Zealand 
context, what are the implications for Bologna and the EHEA elsewhere? Does normative 
influence firmly rest on the material foundation of an attractive European market, and are we 
therefore likely to see the appeal of such frameworks progressively weakened in states where, 
for reasons of geography or other economic, political, social or cultural factors, that market 
bears less apparent lustre? Certainly, the New Zealand case would suggest that in education 
systems characterised by entrenched neoliberal norms, the ability of European Bologna 
norms to penetrate may be limited, beyond prompting compliance confirmation, unless strong 
market incentives are present. Further studies examining such cases beyond New Zealand 
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